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Abstract 
 
Chile was the first country in the world to implement a comprehensive reform of its 
electricity sector in the recent period. Among developing countries only Argentina has 
had a comparably comprehensive and successful reform. This paper traces the history of 
the Chilean reform, which began in 1982, and assesses its progress and its lessons. We 
conclude that the reform has been very successful. We suggest lessons for the generation, 
transmission and distribution sectors, as well as the economic regulation of electricity and 
the general institutional environment favourable to reform. We note that while the initial 
market structure and regulatory arrangements did give rise to certain problems, the 
overall experience argues strongly for the private ownership and operation of the 
electricity industry. 
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Electricity Reform in Chile 
Lessons for Developing Countries 
 
 
1. Background 
 
Chile is the world’s longest running comprehensive electricity reform in the post-World 
War II period. Reforms were first conceived of in 1978 when the National Energy 
Commission (the CNE, now the closest institution to an electricity regulator) was 
established and the reform act – the 1982 Electricity Act – is still the most important law 
regulating the current organisation of the sector. This led to the vertical and horizontal 
break up (beginning in 1981), commercialisation and part privatisation of the existing 
state owned electricity system. Large scale privatisation began in 1986, four years before 
the reorganisation of the electricity sector in England and Wales, arguably the world’s 
most comprehensive electricity reform. Chile’s electricity reform has been hailed as a 
highly successful example of electricity reform in a developing country and a model for 
other privatisations in Latin and America and around the world. 
 
Chile’s electricity sector cannot be disassociated from the rest of the Chilean economy
2
. 
Chile was a democratic country from its inception until 11 September 1973 when the 
socialist government of Salvador Allende was deposed in a military coup headed by 
General Pinochet. Allende’s government (1970-73) had undertaken a mass 
nationalisation of many large companies, including utilities and banks, and presided over 
a major economic slump which saw the government budget deficit reach 12.4% of GDP. 
In 1973 firms under state control constituted 39% of GDP and state owned enterprises 
made a loss of 7.8% of GDP. The military government brutally suppressed its political 
opponents but in contrast to the populist economic policies of military governments 
elsewhere in the region (most notably Argentina) pursued neo-liberal economic ideas 
inspired by Milton Friedman, Al Harberger and other Chicago economists. Within a few 
years many of the previously nationalised companies were being returned to their 
previous owners and large state owned companies, such as electricity companies, were 
being forced to trade on a commercial basis. State owned companies as a whole were 
breaking even by 1979 and into the 1980s electricity companies in particular were 
showing improving rates of return on capital.
3
 
 
The macro economy and many of the main economic indicators began to show 
considerable improvement. Inflation fell and GDP began to grow strongly especially after 
1985. This healthy economic situation further improved following the peaceful return to 
democracy in 1989 when growth accelerated to 6.2% p.a. during the 1990s. Towards the 
end of the military regime there was a major reform of the state pension fund system 
which operated through Pension Fund Management Companies (AFPs). A 1985 reform 
resulted in the AFPs being allowed to invest in private corporations such as privatised 
companies. This stimulated the domestic capital market and led to a growing demand for 
                                                 
2 For summaries of the history of the Chilean privatisation programme see Paredes (2003) and Fisher, 
Gutierrez and Serra (2003). 
3 See Fisher, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.27). 
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stocks, supported initially by legal restrictions on overseas investment by private pension 
funds. This created highly favourable local conditions for the large scale privatisations of 
utilities, including electricity, which took place in the late 1980s. This resulted in a lower 
involvement in overseas investors in the initial privatisations relative to many other 
developing countries. Indeed the electricity industry remained largely domestically 
owned until the later half of the 1990s. 
 
The Chilean constitution established under the military government provides for strong 
defence of property rights and commercial information. This is coupled with a legal 
system based very largely on tangible proof of illegal activity which makes it difficult to 
argue on the basis of reasonable cause. This has made it difficult for anti-trust cases to 
proceed.4 The 1980 constitution ensures that the function of the judiciary is to protect 
property rights from legislative and administrative abuses5. The democratic system has 
ensured successive coalition governments where one party has not been able to 
simultaneously command a majority in both houses of parliament. This constitutional 
arrangement has had the effect of making it difficult to reform laws established under the 
military regime. Many of those laws specify in detail the methods of regulation to be used 
by government departments. This has two countervailing effects: first, it severely limits 
the scope of civil servants and ministers to interpret laws in the light of new 
developments and, second, it insures the stability of the regulatory regime. Both of these 
effects were intentional on part of those who developed the constitution and were aimed 
at preventing the economic radicalism of the Allende government being easily repeated. 
 
Chile is an interesting case study of electricity reform because it shares many of the 
features of developing countries’ electricity systems. The population is relatively small 
(15.6m in 2002) and hence the ability to exploit economies of scale, if they exist, is 
moderate. Although the GDP per head in Chile is relatively high at $4120 US in 2002, it 
was only $1770 (2002 US dollars) in 1982.6 Electricity consumption per head is low by 
developed country standards but is increasing rapidly (6% per annum). The electricity 
generation system has a large installed hydro capacity base (38% for the country as a 
whole, but 58% in the central system)
7
 but as demand increases fossil fuels have become 
more important (in this it is comparable to Columbia and the south west of Brazil). 
However Chile is perhaps unusual among developing countries because of the strength of 
protection for private property and the stability engendered by the long period of 
economically disciplined military rule. 
 
2. Chile’s Electricity Reform 
 
In 1974 Chile’s electricity utilities were in a mess.8 Inflation, high fuel prices and price 
controls on final prices had led to large losses and a lack of investment under public 
                                                 
4 See Basanes, Saavedra and Soto (1999, p.24). 
5 See Bitran and Serra (1998). 
6 Source: World Bank, ‘Chile at a Glance’, at www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/chl_aag.pdf 
7 Shares of capacity in 2003 (CDEC-SIC Annual Report 2003, p.7). 
8 Endesa, the largest utility, made a loss of 4.3% on equity in 1974, while Chilectra, the second largest 
utility made a loss of 3.2% on equity in 1974 (Fischer, Guiterrez and Serra, 2003, p.27). 
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ownership. This situation reflected the impact of nationalisation and the OPEC oil crisis. 
The government wanted to reorganise the sector in order to introduce economic 
discipline. Economists in the government, several of whom had studied at the University 
of Chicago, were charged with redesigning the regulatory and legal framework within 
which the companies operated. In the first years of the 1980s they designed the legal 
framework established in the 1982 Electricity Act
9
, which is still the most important 
legislation governing the sector. However in January 2004 there were some subtantial 
amendments to the laws governing the sector following the passage of the Ley Corta, of 
which, more later. In what follows our analysis mainly refers to the arrangements before 
the passage of this new law as it is too new to give rise to much experience. 
 
At the time there was not a lot of recent reform experience in electricity generation 
markets to draw on, however officials did visit the UK, France and Belgium. From these 
countries they came back with the idea of separate generation and distribution companies 
where power was paid for according to a formula based on the cost (as UK Area Boards 
then paid the Central Electricity Generating Board), a dispatch system based on marginal 
cost pricing (as perfected by the French company, EDF) and a system of trading power 
between generators to meet customer contracts (as existed in Belgium). These 
observations gave rise to the partial vertical disintegration
10
 of the sector and the 
formation of a wholesale power trading mechanism. Vertical disintegration and power 
markets are central to modern ideas of electricity reform. 
 
Following the break-up of the incumbent integrated companies a number of regional 
power markets based on the concept of an Independent System Operator (the CDEC) 
were established in 1986.11 There are two main regional power markets: the SIC – 
covering the southern and central areas including Santiago – and the SING covering the 
northern part of the country. Within these markets generators were required to declare 
availability and plant marginal operating cost every hour. These declarations would be 
used to dispatch power plants and to set the basic marginal energy price or spot price. 
This price has to be used by the power generators to trade electricity among themselves 
to meet contracts. The spot price is heavily influenced by the opportunity cost of water in 
the SIC system and always equals this price. The price of water is calculated by a 
computer model (OMSIC) for the main Laja reservoir. Under normal conditions the 
opportunity cost is equal to the operating cost of the most expensive thermal plant 
dispatched. If there is a water shortage the spot price becomes the outage cost. The 
outage cost is equal to an amount based on consumer willingness to accept compensation 
for a planned outage of a particular magnitude. For a less than 10% demand restriction it 
is around 4-5 times the normal spot price.  
 
                                                 
9 Mining Ministry of Chile (1982), Law DFL No.1: General Law for Electric Services referring to Electric 
Energy, available at www.cne.cl. 
10 The vertical disintegration was only partial because although the main integrated company, Endesa, was 
vertically and horizontally unbundled, it initially retained a large share of its generation and all of its former 
high voltage transmission grid. 
11 See Vignolo (2000) for details of the pricing mechanism in the CDEC-SIC. 
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Regulated prices for generated electricity are determined on the basis of the expected spot 
price of energy over the next 4 years and this price is fixed for six months in April and 
November. This is calculated using a computer program (GOL) which is a crude version 
of the OMSIC model. This node price is then converted into the regulated price of 
generated electricity at each of the basic substations of the system by an energy 
penalisation factor (to reflect system losses). This gives the node energy prices. To these 
are added the node peak capacity charges which reflect the annual marginal cost of 
increasing system capacity assuming a specified reserve margin. This is paid to available 
generators and reflects the capital and operating costs including a 10% return of the 
newest technology on the system. This is similarly adjusted by a capacity penalisation 
factor. 
 
In the regulation of distribution charges there was little experience to draw on and only 
the general principles of incentive regulation – itself undeveloped as a discipline at the 
time.
12
 The economists devised the idea of setting a tariff for distribution which was 
unrelated to the actual costs of the distribution company and hence gave it perfect 
incentives to cut costs. This would avoid the well known distortions of the rate of return 
regulation based system which existed in the US (and was heavily criticised by Chicago 
economists). The revenue for the distribution companies was to be set on the basis of the 
costs of a model company. Two independent consultants reports would be commissioned 
to model the network which a distribution company with given demands and sources of 
supply would require and to assess the cost of running that model network. These reports 
would be averaged (2/3 weight on the regulator's consultant report, 1/3 weight on the 
company's consultant report) to fix prices for distribution (the value added in distribution 
or VAD) relative to an inflation rate for the next four years. The inflation rate was to be a 
company specific weighted combination of the consumer price index, the price of copper, 
the wholesale prices and an earnings index. This model mirrors the later suggestions for 
RPI-X regulation (Littlechild, 1983) and yardstick competition based on average costs in 
other similar firms (Shleifer, 1985). The distribution charges are regulated by the 
National Energy Commission. 
 
In transmission the economists who designed the system envisaged a system where 
generators would have to pay for transmission to get electricity to their customers. 
Payment for existing transmission access was to be based on negotiated tariffs coupled 
with compulsory right of access if capacity was available.
13
 New connections and lines 
were to be paid for by the generators, who were free to negotiate terms with transmission 
companies or build their own. This emphasis on what we now know as merchant 
transmission was revolutionary at the time when contrasted with the centralisation of 
transmission investment decisions in large integrated companies. There was to be no 
planning of transmission expansions. Incumbent transmission companies were to be 
unable to pass on costs of new transmission wires to existing customers with their 
negotiated consent. The lack of concern for the externalities inherent in transmission 
                                                 
12 For a description of the system of regulation of distribution see Di Tella and Dyck (2002, pp.32-34). It is 
worth noting that one of the seminal papers on incentive regulation was not published until 1982 (Baron 
and Myerson, 1982). 
13 See Vignolo (2000, p.20). 
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networks, especially those caused by loop flows, is partly a function of linear nature of 
the electricity grid in Chile which is caused by the fact that Chile is a long thin country 
where the capital, Santiago, serves as the focal point for electricity supply in the SIC 
system. Although transmission charges were not regulated under this system, the rate of 
return in transmission was limited by the need for transmission companies to hold tender 
auctions for the building of new lines. 
 
The concept of two types of customers – regulated and free – was established in the 1982 
law.14 Free customers were those with maximum demand above 2MW. These customers 
were free to contract directly with generators for the supply of power. Regulated 
customers were customers of the local distribution companies who could not contact 
directly with generators. These customers paid the regulated price of distribution plus a 
node price of energy which was based on the combination of the forecast short run 
marginal cost of energy, the capacity charge and the relevant transmission charge. 
Although not envisaged as being a radical new development at the time – no one even in 
Chile foresaw full supply competition – this distinction did create opportunity for some 
customers of the distribution companies to seek alternative suppliers. 
 
The regulatory framework established in 1982 consists of a number of different 
institutions.
15
 The National Energy Commission (CNE, established in 1978 to advise on 
long term strategy) has responsibility for advising the Minister of Economy on electricity 
policy, it is also responsible for the setting of regulated distribution charges. A 
Superintendent of Prices of Electricity and Fuels (SEC) has responsibility for data 
collection for the purposes of enforcement and regulation, handling of customer 
complaints and the implementation of service quality fines and customer compensations. 
In regulation the CNE uses data provided by the SEC on company costs. The law places 
limits on the number and background of civil servants working in the CNE. The Minister 
of Energy formally imposes the regulated tariffs and retains control over the issuing of 
rationing decrees during periods of drought when there is a shortage of hydro-electric 
generating capacity. The Minister also had responsibility for settling disputes in the 
CDEC board within 120 days, though this was altered in 1999. Currently disputes go to 
an Arbitration Panel (of three experts) which has 30 days to issue a judgement, if this is 
rejected by the CDEC board then the Minister has 60 days to issue a judgement. The 
Minister is himself part of a 5 member cabinet council which oversees the sector. Merger 
policy, abuse of dominance and collusion remain within the remit of the Office of the 
National Economic Prosecutor, Chile’s Competition Regulator, which has a regulated 
utilities division. The Fiscalaria can present cases to the Antimonopoly Commission. This 
Commission has a Prevention Commission and a Resolution (or appeals) Commission. 
Companies have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. This process has been 
somewhat refined by the 2004 Ley Corta in order to speed up the processing of disputes. 
 
The initial restructuring of the electricity industry was extensive.16 Endesa, a state-owned 
company created in 1944 with extensive generation, transmission and distribution assets 
                                                 
14 See Fischer and Galetovic (2000, pp.7-9). 
15 See Basanes, Saavdra and Soto (1999) and Fischer and Galetovic (2000) for details. 
16 See Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003). 
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across the country, was split into 14 companies. These included 6 generation companies 
(including Endesa and Colbun), 6 distribution companies and 2 small isolated companies 
in the south providing generation and distribution. Chilectra which had been privately 
owned until 1970 and controlled distribution in Santiago was split into 3 firms: a 
generation company (Gener) and two distribution companies (including Chilmetro, now 
part of Chilectra). The privatisations of electricity companies yielded $1200m (in year 
end 1995 prices) or 50% of privatisation proceeds between 1985 and 1989. Endesa, 
Gener and Chilmetro were sold off between 1985 and 1989. Initially this came through 
sales to workers but eventually through public offers. Subsequent mergers, however, 
severed to partially re-integrate the industry. 
 
While the initial restructuring was radical, substantial market power remained. In 
particular, Endesa remained the dominant player. In terms of generation it was by far the 
largest company with a 58% market share in the SIC and control of most of the national 
water rights for many unexploited hydro resources as well as the main La Laja lake hydro 
plants which formed a substantial part of total generation in wet years. Colbun was 
created as the holding company for two hydro plants which were then under construction 
by Endesa. Initially this was wholly publicly owned. The existing high voltage 
transmission grid was left largely in the hands of Endesa. Further integration of Endesa in 
distribution followed within a few years. 
 
Since the initial privatisations there has some change in the ownership structure. In 
generation the market share of Endesa has fallen substantially as a result of a share rise in 
the share of Colbun and the entry of some small new entrants. However Endesa has 
integrated into distribution and retailing when it became part of the Enersis Group in 
1989 which also controls Chilectra. Colbun was part-privatised from 1993 but eventually 
fully privatised in 1997. Endesa fought a long running battle with the competition 
authorities over its ownership of the transmission network in the SIC. After initially 
overturning an unfavourable ruling from the Antimonopoly Commission in 1993 in the 
Supreme Court, in 2000 under continuing pressure from the authorities Endesa 
voluntarily sold its Transelec business to Hydro-Quebec. By the late 1990s foreign firms 
had gained majority ownership of the Chilean electricity system. Colbun is part of the 
Tractabel Group of Belgium (who controlled 50.6% of the company stock in 2002). 
Enersis is majority owned (65% in 2002) by Endesa of Spain. Gener is almost wholly 
owned by AES of the US (98.65% in 2002). 
 
There have been some attempts to change the 1982 Electricity Act in order to adjust to 
developments in the sector over the last 20 years. The most important change (before the 
passage of the Ley Corta) came in 1999, enacted after the drought of 1998-99 which led 
to electricity rationing. This law forces distributors to compensate customers for energy 
losses during rationing and also establishes an obligation on generators to meet 
reasonable demands from distributors even in the absence of contracts. This law was 
enacted because for the regulated sector there were seen to be insufficient incentives – 
given that distributors can only pass through the node price – to sign long-term contracts 
to assure supply or compensation in cases of drought. This law importantly reformed the 
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governance of the CDEC, making decisions of the operations directorate legally binding 
while verdicts are pending following disagreements on the CDEC board. 
 
In 2000 a substantial revision of the Electricity Act was debated but this proved to be too 
controversial and too complicated to be enacted. However in the summer of 2003 another 
new law, the so-called Ley Corta (or Short Law), was debated in parliament. This was 
passed in January 2004.
17
 This law is seen as a way of addressing some of the most 
pressing shortcomings of the current system in a timely way.18 In particular there was a 
concern to address what was perceived to be an unwillingness to invest in new generation 
and transmission facilities given the low node price and problems with the agreeing 
payments for new transmission lines. 
 
The Short Law has introduced a number of significant changes to the operation of the 
market as discussed above.
19
 We discuss those that are most relevant to points we make 
below. First, it provides for the reform of transmission charging such that Transelec is 
now able to recover 100% of the toll revenue required to pay for its existing lines. This 
will be based on a four yearly international study of the replacement value of its assets 
and a regulated rate of return. This is aimed at reducing the number of disputes over the 
level and allocation of payment for transmission rights. Second, the node price (paid by 
captive customers) is not allowed to vary by more than 5% from the free market price 
(rather than the current 10%). This should result in significantly less risk for generators in 
supplying the captive market.  Third, the threshold level for free market customers able to 
choose their supplier is reduced from 2 MW to 0.5 MW. This will lift most non-
residential customers out of the captive market and significantly increase the competition 
for customers directly connected to the distribution system. Fourth, there is to be greater 
regulation of the access charges charged by distributors to competitive suppliers of 
customers connected to the distribution network. As we discuss below the lack of 
regulation of third party access charges to the distribution network is a serious problem 
for the competitive supply market at the moment. Fifth, a market for ancilliary services is 
to be introduced. This will allow active trading of reactive power and voltage control 
services. 
 
3. The Performance of the Chilean Electricity Sector since 1982  
 
In this section we report some indicators of performance of the sector over the reform 
period. The areas which we look at are those which relate most directly to the social 
welfare effects of the reform and those indicators of most importance in a developing 
country context. Detailed data can be found in the information appendices. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Actually the Law of Electrical Services of 22 January 2004. 
18 The term ‘Short’ refers to the original intention to enact a short, quick piece of legislation before 
eventually enacting a longer, more comprehensive law. 
19 See www.cne.cl for details of the provisions of the Short Law. 
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3.1 Investment 
 
Between the beginning of 1982 and the early 2004 the installed capacity in the main SIC 
system expanded from 2713 MW to 6991 MW (4.1% p.a.), while installed capacity in the 
SING system expanded from 428 MW to 3634 MW (10.2% p.a.). The reserve margin at 
the peak in 2003 was 26% in the SIC and 59% in the SING (highest demand divided by 
available capacity). The mostly thermal SING system suffers from over capacity, while 
the hydro-dominated SIC system has been subject to rationing in dry years. The 
expansion of generation capacity was achieved largely under private ownership and while 
keeping prices in low. At the same time the number of units delivered has increased by 
6.2% p.a. to around 42800 GWh in 2003. Endesa's domestic investment between 1991 
and 2000 totalled $2.3bn.20 
 
In transmission the route length of transmission lines in the main SIC system (at 500, 
220, 154 and 110 kV) expanded from 4310 Km in 1982 to 8555 Km in 2002 (3.7% p.a.); 
for the SING system the figures are 363 Km and 5093 Km (14.9% p.a.)
21
. In distribution 
the total number of electricity customers was 4.177m (of which Chilectra had 1.274m) in 
2001. The number of regulated electricity customers rose by 4.4% p.a. between 1999 and 
2002. Between 1982 and 2002 the percentage of households with electricity supply 
increased 38% to 86% in rural areas and from 95% to 98% in urban areas. 
 
While recent debates around the Ley Corta have been motivated at least partly by a 
perceived lack of incentive to invest in new capacity going forward, by any standards the 
investment which has occurred since 1982 is impressive. 
 
3.2 Prices 
 
Prices of electricity in Chile are low by international standards. In 2002 the average 
residential price was 8.25 US cents per kWh and the average industrial price was 5.51 US 
cents per kWh.
22
 In 2000 prices were around the average for Latin America for 
residential prices but in the lowest quartile of prices for industrial consumers
23
. These 
prices reflect the presence of significantly higher percentages of hydro-electric generation 
in some of the countries with cheaper electricity prices, e.g. Venezuela, Parguay and 
Ecuador. 
 
Between 1992 and 2002 average electricity prices have fallen by almost 30% in real 
terms demonstrating superior performance to prices for water, gas and telecoms. This fall 
reflects falls in the regulated value added in distribution and a significant fall in the 
regulated node price of energy (see Figure 1).24 In the SIC system the node price 
(including energy and capacity charges) of power delivered to Santiago fell from 30.93 
Chilean Pesos (CLP) per KWh in October 1982 to 23.97 CLP per KWh in October 2003 
                                                 
20 Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.41). 
21 Source: www.cne.cl 
22 Source: www.olade.org.ec. 
23 UN Statistics, December 2000. 
24 For details of node prices see www.cne.cl. 
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(prices in Jan 2004 Pesos), a fall of 22%. In the SING system the node price of power 
delivered to Antofaqasta fell from 105.3 CLP per kWh in October 1984 to 24.24 CLP per 
kWh in October 2003 (prices in Jan 2004 Pesos), a fall of 77%. The VAD for Chilectra 
fell by 18% in the rate setting process of 1992, 5% in 1996, 18% in 2000 and 8% in 
2004.
25
 
 
3.3 Financial Performance of Companies 
 
The low price of electricity and high rates of investment in the sector have been 
accompanied by strong financial performance by the companies involved (see Figure 2). 
Financial performance was respectable before privatisation but improved markedly 
afterwards. Chilectra averaged a nominal historic cost return on equity of 32% p.a. during 
1996-98, while Endesa's return on equity peaked at 15.7% in 1994.26 The average real 
rate of return on capital at replacement cost in the distribution sector was a highly 
respectable 13.9% in 2002, this is at the high end of the range of rates of return permitted 
by law (5-15%). The high returns in distribution seem to reflect initially generous 
regulatory reviews of the VAD. In generation and transmission returns were initially high 
following privatisation but since the arrival of natural gas from Argentina in 1997, which 
sparked a lot of new building of gas fired plants, returns have been more modest. In 2003 
historic cost rate of return on equity for Colbun was 14.8%, AES-Gener was 6.6% and 
Endesa was 5.0%
27
. These were respectable rates of return given the large sunk costs 
which both Endesa and Colbun have in hydro-electric investments and the generally poor 
performance of investments outside Chile.  
 
3.4 Efficiency Improvements 
 
The combination of falls in prices and high rates of return reflect superb efficiency 
improvements (see Figure 3). In Endesa's electricity generation business labour 
productivity improved from 6.3 GWh generated per worker in 1991 to 35.0 GWh per 
worker in 2003.
28
 In Chilectra electricity distribution labour productivity improved from 
1.4 GWh sales per worker in 1987 to 14.1 GWh sales per worker in 2003.
29
 These figures 
are impressive even compared to the performance of UK privatised electricity 
companies.
30
 
 
                                                 
25 Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.43) and ‘Editorial: Chile Distribution tariffs to drop 8% 
from November’, Power in Latin America, 19th November 2004. 
26 Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.44). 
27 Net income divided by shareholders’ equity. Source: Colbun, AES-Gener and Endesa Annual Reports 
2003. 
28 Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.41) and Endesa Annual Report 2003. 
29 Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.42) and Chilectra Annual Report 2003. 
30 Newbery and Pollitt (1997) find that for the CEGB (responsible for generation and transmission of 
electricity in England and Wales labour productivity increased from 4.7 GWh generated per employee to 
10.4 GWh  generated per employee over the period 1985-86 to 1995-96. Domah and Pollitt (2001) found 
that in the distribution and supply businesses of the 12 regional electricity companies in England and Wales 
labour productivity increased from 2.5 GWh sales per employee in 1985-86 to 5.5 GWh sales per employee 
in 1997-98. 
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Interestingly there has been a particularly rapid improvement in labour productivity since 
the takeover of the formerly domestically controlled companies by foreign companies. 
Between 1999 and 2002 the total number of employees in the electricity sector fell from 
8264 to 5706. 
 
3.5 Rural Electrification 
 
A notable success in Chile has been the increase in connections of rural customers to 
electricity networks. Although most people in Chile do live in urban areas and the degree 
of urbanisation is high, 62% of rural households (some 269,841 homes) were without 
electricity supply in 1982. By 2002 only 14% of rural households were without 
electricity. Most of the progress has been made in the last 10 years following the 
establishment of a national programme for rural electrification (REP) administered by the 
National Fund for Regional Development. Under this fund there is tripartite funding of 
the capital costs of rural connections whereby the users pay 10%, companies 20% and 
state funding 70% with users expected to pay for running costs. 
 
3.6 Quality of Supply 
 
Quality of supply has significantly improved in the Chilean electricity sector since 1982. 
Technical (due to resistance) and non-technical (due to theft) losses fell sharply. Across 
the country technical energy losses in the distribution system fell from 10.2% in 1982 to 
6.2% in 2002. For Chilectra, the major distribution utility in Santiago, technical and non-
technical energy losses fell from 19.8% in 1987 to 5.6% in 2003 (see Figure 4).31 This 
reflects a significant improvement in the metering and bill collection in order to reduce 
non-technical losses (i.e. theft). It also reflects targeted investments by companies 
increasing the difficulty of putting up illegal connections to the electricity grid. 
 
Power outages due to transmission system failures have fallen since privatisation. In the 
Transelec transmission system the number of minutes of supply interruption per year 
(TEI or equivalent minutes of interruption at the system’s peak demand time) was 2.10 in 
2003, down from 9.60 in 1997.
32
 
 
3.7 Major problems 
 
The Chilean electricity system has operated successfully for almost all of the 20 years 
since restructuring; however there was a serious problem in the summer of 1998-99 when 
there were repeated power outages caused by a lack of water to power the hydroelectric 
plants.33 The year was extremely dry and hydrological conditions were the least 
favourable since the last major drought in 1968-69. Indeed it was the worst drought in the 
previous 40 years. The main dam La Laja - which at its maximum can store 6820 GWh of 
electric power and is able to store water from one year to the next - was emptied. 
 
                                                 
31 Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.42) and Chilectra Annual Report 2002. 
32 See Transelec Annual Report 2003, p.26. 
33 For an analysis see Fischer and Galetovic (2000). 
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The price setting mechanism (for the regulated node price) and planning systems failed to 
anticipate the seriousness of the water shortages. This led to the early release of water 
combined with a lack of fossil generation and random blackouts. Node prices fell 
throughout the period before and during the crisis: by 11% in April 1998, 8% in October 
1998 and 5% in April 1999. Blackouts began in November 1998 and continued to April 
1999 with eventually a total of 500 GWh of electricity not being supplied. While the 
hydrological conditions faced by the system were extreme the inability of the system to 
cope with predictably extreme conditions (statistically Chile should suffer an extreme 
drought once every 20 years) did expose a number of the issues that we will discuss later. 
 
A further major problem has arisen recently caused by the aftermath of the 2002 collapse 
in the Argentine peso34. Chile relies on imports of gas from Argentina to fuel its gas fired 
power plants. These imports are the subject of a 1995 treaty between the two countries. 
This treaty guarantees that, in the event of a domestic fuel shortage, Argentina will only 
reduce supplies to Chile in proportion to the fuel shortage in Argentina. Following the 
collapse of the peso, domestic prices of Argentine gas and electricity were frozen in 
pesos in spite of high inflation and a fall in the value of the peso against the dollar of two 
thirds. The Argentine economy recovered sharply in 2003 as low prices fuelled export led 
growth. This has resulted in soaring energy demand in Argentina. In early 2004 there 
were power cuts. In March 2004 Argentina unilaterally announced that it would reduce 
exports of gas to Chile by 15%.  
 
The cuts in gas exports have had serious implications for Chile.35 First, coupled with a 
shortage of available hydroelectric capacity it has necessitated expensive substitution of 
fuel oil for gas. The cost of fuel substitition is estimated at $32m over 6 months. Second, 
it has raised the possible requirement for investment in expensive liquid natural gas 
(LNG) import facilities to import Indonesian gas by tanker (these could amount to 
$500m). In November 2004 Chile signed a preliminary agreement to import LNG from 
Indonesia from 2007 or 2008.36 The shortage of Argentine gas has been significant in 
forcing the SIC system 6 monthly node price for wholesale electricity up by 7% in May 
2004 and by 10% in November 2004.
37
 
 
4. Detailed Lessons from the Reforms of the Chilean Electricity Sector 
 
We discuss the reforms in detail looking at the issues under five headings: generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing, practice of regulation and general institutional 
framework. In our view the picture that emerges is one a system which has worked well 
and delivered widespread benefits since its inception. In 1982, the design of the 
electricity market was well ahead of its time. By 2003, the design of the system was 
                                                 
34 See Pollitt (2004). 
35 See ‘What sort of neighour is this?’, The Economist, 15th May 2004, p.34. 
36 See ‘Indonesia agrees to supply up to 4.0 Mln T LNG to Chile Annually’, Latin America News Digest, 
24th November 2004. 
37 See ‘Central grid node prices to rise 6.7%, fall 6.7% in north’, Business News Americas, 20th April 2004, 
and ‘Fitch: Node price increases ‘consistent’’, Business News Americas, 19th October 2004. 
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beginning to show signs of age and was ripe for reform in a number of areas.
38
 As a 
general rule the system needs to reflect the institutional lessons that have been learned 
since 1982. To summarise these under each of our five headings: 
 
A. Generation markets work best when characterised by a lack of integration with 
monopoly transmission and distribution networks, low degrees of concentration in the 
price setting segment of the market and when generators freely contract with 
customers. 
B. Transmission systems need appropriate regulation of incumbents to ensure both fair 
prices and an adequate rate of return on investment. There needs to be some 
institution charged with proposing and overseeing system wide planning to ensure 
timely building of new transmission links. 
C. Distribution companies need to be regulated to ensure that distribution charges both 
incentivise efficiency and are fair. Third party access charge regulation is essential to 
ensure efficient financial bypass of the distribution network by customers free to 
choose supplier. Supply competition is itself feasible for all industrial and commercial 
customers and has been successfully implemented for residential customers in some 
countries. 
D. Economic regulation of the electricity sector is best practised by a single independent 
regulatory agency with minimal ministerial control. Statutory duties to ensure 
adequate planning of future demands in the sector can be effectively delegated to this 
body. Output based regulation using appropriate quasi-market mechanisms can deal 
with issues of quality of supply, network extension and consumer cross-subsidy 
which are the areas most subject to political interference. 
E. The general institutional environment in which the electricity sector is placed must be 
stable and foster long-term investment based on protection from arbitrary changes in 
government policy. Legislation regarding the electricity sector should by credible and 
sustainable. However there should be the capacity for the regulation regarding the 
system to respond to new information. The ability of the regulator and the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) to do this requires clear and quick dispute 
resolution/review mechanisms especially in the case of disputes between companies 
and the regulatory agency. Given the technical nature of many of the issues this 
should involve specialist arbitration panels perhaps under the authority of the general 
Competition Agency. 
 
4.1 The Generation Sector 
 
The Chilean electricity system illustrates that it is possible to have effective 
competition and privatisation in a relatively small power market with significant 
hydro generation.  Chile’s power market has successfully delivered low prices and 
reasonable rates of return for investors in spite of both the SIC and the SING markets 
being initially small. This has been due to a combination of free entry into the generation 
sector and the price restraint posed by the marginal cost based bidding system in the 
power pool which has limited the short run exercising of market power by the three 
                                                 
38 A good recent review of the Chilean electricity sector reform and its shortcomings see Fischer and Serra 
(2000) and Joskow (2000). 
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incumbent generators. The result of free entry has been that their market share of capacity 
has fallen from 79.7% in 1993 to 59.1% in 2003 with the share of the largest company, 
Endesa, falling from 47.7% to 27.6%.
39
 This situation has come about in part due to the 
lack of restrictions on new building and the fact that the linear nature of the transmission 
system has made upgrading the transmission links reasonably straightforward.  The 
Chilean system illustrates the success of private ownership of generation combined with 
free entry in the presence of cost based bidding. 
 
The obvious question that arises is whether the cost based bidding system in the pool 
should be replaced by a price based bidding system? In theory this would provide better 
signals for long-term investment as dispatch would be on the basis of the scarcity value 
of electricity rather than on the basis of current costs. It would also reduce the 
transactions costs of the current system where submitted costs need to be audited and 
where there is some scope for gaming in the declarations of costs (given that fuel costs 
are checked with reference world market prices rather than on actual costs and heat rates 
are assumed).
40
 These distortions to optimal dispatch and efficient price signals seem 
small compared with the potential for the exercise of market power that exists in the 
current SIC system. This originates in the continuing large share of the three largest firms 
in the price setting region of the market and in the ability of the generators to strategically 
release water to drive up the price at times when generating capacity is tight. In particular 
Endesa’s La Laja plants can provide 25% of annual demand in a wet year. 
 
Simulations suggest that even if companies were to bid up their offer prices to those of 
next most expensive generation set on the system prices would rise by up to 27%41, while 
if the companies were simply to maximise profits as within a non-collusive Cournot 
oligopoly prices might rise 60%42. Competitive dispatch of Endesa’s hydro capacity and 
divestiture of its thermal generation plant would reduce the problem but prices might still 
rise by 16%.43 In the light of these results it is not sensible to recommend a switch to 
price based bidding in the SIC system. The situation is rather different in the largely 
thermal SING system. Price based bidding is possible but the benefits remain small.
44
 
One problem is that there is current over-capacity which might lead in the short term to 
very low prices. Another issue is whether future interconnection of the two systems 
would be facilitated by them having different bidding and dispatch systems. 
 
The integration of distribution and generators leads to an inability for non-
integrated generators to compete for the customers of the distribution business.  
This is because of the inability of non-integrated generators to gain access to the 
distribution network. Although the Chilean system is divided into ‘free’ and ‘regulated’ 
customers this does not mean that there is a competitive market for the provision of 
                                                 
39 Source: CDEC-SIC Annual Reports. 
40 Essentially generators face a tight price cap but can choose to bid any ‘cost’ between their actual cost and 
the ISO calculated cost. The scope for exercising market power by raising the cost declaration of marginal 
plant is small but does exist. 
41 See Watts, Atienzza and Rudnick (2003). 
42 Arellano (2003). 
43 Arellano (2003). 
44 See Watts, Atienzza and Rudnick (2003). 
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energy services to large users. What it means is that there are customers who receive 
supply from their incumbent supply company on the basis of an energy price which is set 
in the power pool (‘free’ customers) and regulated customers who pay the regulated node 
price for energy. Chilectra which is integrated with Endesa is the largest incumbent 
distribution and supply company in Chile. Between 1982 and 2003 it lost just 2 of its 
2000 large customers to other companies. This indicates that there is relatively little 
competition between generators for customers embedded in the distribution network 
because the access charges / terms to the distribution network are not properly regulated 
to prevent discriminatory charging.  In general generators should be allowed to merge 
with retailers but not with retailers and distribution wire businesses as this potentially 
creates the same access problems as arise when generation and transmission are merged. 
We discuss this further in the section on the distribution sector. 
 
A market for ancillary services should be introduced. While it does seem to be 
premature to introduce a price based bidding system in the market for energy on the 
grounds that the incumbent firms still have too much potential for market power this is 
not the case in the market for ancillary services. Ancillary services (such as voltage 
control and black start capabilities) are currently remunerated with reference to the 
marginal energy costs of providing the services. However as almost all generators, 
transmission companies and large customers can provide some ancillary services there 
are enough potential competitors for this to be a free market in the SIC system.  The Ley 
Corta does now provide for the establishment of such a market.  
 
Governance of CDEC-SIC has been problematic and should be widened to include 
customer interests. The CDEC-SIC (and the CDEC-SING) is overseen by a governing 
board. The membership of the board is prescribed by law and consists of representatives 
of generators (with more than 9MW connected to the system) and transmission 
companies (with more than 100 km of high voltage lines). The law requires unanimity in 
voting for any rule changes and the dispute resolution proceed described above can take 
up to 4 months. This introduces a substantial delay into the dispute resolution process 
within a system where disputes are encouraged by the need for unanimity in decision 
marking.  Relations within the CDEC have become increasingly adversarial over time as 
the interests of Endesa have diverged from the newer generators. The number of disputes 
referred to the Minister for Economy rose steadily through the 1990s.
45
 
 
It is striking that in contrast to other countries only generators and transmission 
companies are represented on the board. In other countries there would be demand side 
representation – distribution companies and large users at a minimum. Representation of 
the demand side is important when decisions about operation of the market are taken to 
ensure that these do not collectively increase the profitability of suppliers. In particular it 
is important that there are those on the board who can represent potential entrants into the 
generation market. The absence of any customer representation on the CDEC board also 
means that discussions about the quality and availability rules of the do not include 
informed comment about customer preferences for such variables. Increasing 
                                                 
45 See Basanes, Saavedra and Soto (1999). There was 1 dispute between 1984 and 1990, 2 per year from 
1991 to 1994, and then a steady rise to 11 in 1998. 
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representation on the CDEC might lead to more disputes under the current unanimity and 
dispute resolution procedures but should be coupled with reform of those procedures. 
 
The continuing high market share of 3 companies in the SIC is potentially 
problematic in the future. It is generally agreed that the generation market is currently 
operating in a way that yields near competitive outcomes. The spot price is close to the 
marginal cost of new gas fired plant. An important boost to competition came in 1997 
when Argentine gas arrived in Chile and this facilitated an increase in gas fired 
generation and lowering of the marginal cost of energy. However the incumbent firms 
retain a large market share and Endesa has control of 75% of the water rights to 
undeveloped hydro-electric sites. In Aysen area Endesa has 30% of the water rights but 
no generation and recently refused to grant water rights for a new facility to supply a 
proposed aluminium power plant.46  Increased tightening of environmental controls on 
the siting of new thermal plants and local objections to new hydro-electric schemes may 
mean that conditions for new entrants may not be so favourable in the future. A move to 
price based competition may be a desirable in the long run but is not feasible in the short 
run. 
 
The UK market demonstrates that it is possible for three firms to tacitly collude in the 
power market very easily.
47
 If there is continuing strong market demand growth and it 
becomes more difficult for new entrants to build new plants or get access to gas then 
there will be a problem with market power. It is also clear that genuine supply 
competition between generators is going to be limited by the lack of competitors. In our 
conversations with generators it seemed that some of them understood that it was not 
worth competing for free customers who were purchasing their electricity from other 
generators because of the threat of retaliation – this is classic circumstantial evidence for 
tacit collusion48. If the three incumbents do not continue to lose significant market share 
then there will be a need for a structural remedy ahead of any move towards price based 
bidding or full liberalisation of the supply market. 
 
Fuel security is an important issue for a country like Chile and steps should be 
taken to optimise the risk of supply interruption. The recent shortage of Argentine gas 
due to the breaking of an international treaty raises serious economic questions about the 
way to manage fuel security. Clearly good international relations are the most cost 
effective way to minimise fuel costs. However the presence of significant fuel supply 
interruption risk means that careful assessment of the costs of alternative supplies need to 
be made. Chile needs to assess the relative costs and benefits of: improved relations with 
alternative pipeline gas suppliers, such as Bolivia; natural gas storage facilities; 
conversion to fuel oil; and the building of LNG import facilities. Especial care needs to 
be taken to avoid over investing in fuel security. 
 
 
                                                 
46 See Barsanes, Saavendra and Soto (1999, p.19-20). 
47 See Green and Newbery (1992). 
48 See Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1986) report on British Salt for a similar admission of tacit 
collusion between the two main white salt producers in the UK. 
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4.2 The Transmission Sector 
 
The Chilean regime for unregulated transmission access charges has worked 
reasonably well in terms of the development of the system to date, however that does 
not mean that system wide planning is not necessary in the future.  The current 
system of transmission charging has worked well in the sense that there have been no 
major lines which have failed to have been built when the economic benefits were 
positive. This is a function of the fact that the system of negotiated third party access 
does tend to lead to an efficient solution in the absence of externalities and in the 
presence of low negotiation costs. This is the case in a linear transmission system where 
generators connect at various points along common network backbone. This is because it 
is easy to establish who should pay for new transmission and how much. However as the 
degree of meshing and loop flows increases in the system negotiated solutions become 
much more complex and gameable. In these circumstances system wide planning and 
determination of access terms is likely to become more valuable. That said it should be 
pointed out that transmission system planning must be market driven rather than subject 
to political interference. Littlechild and Skerk (2004) argue that Argentina provides an 
example of a country where in the past transmission projects have been driven by 
political pressures from remote regions rather than rational transmission system planning. 
Such pressures can lead to overbuilding of transmission lines, the costs of which are 
borne by the system as a whole rather than those proposing them. 
 
The current system has involved disputes and significant transaction costs in 
negotiations.49 Colbun had a long running dispute with Endesa/Translec about 
transmission tolls. During 1994 Transelec wanted $21m in tolls but the annual cost of 
building its own line was $11.5m. When Colbun threatened to build a new line Transelec 
dropped its price to $10.3m. However in 1997 Colbun decided to build its own line 
anyway. To the extent that the negotiation led to unnecessary duplication of assets this 
was an additional negotiation cost. Undoubtedly this situation was made worse by the 
vertical integration of Endesa and Transelec. An independent transmission company and 
a system of unregulated transmission access would have worked better but would still 
lead to higher transaction costs than under planned transmission system expansions. The 
Ley Corta has recognised this point and in future average transmission charges will be 
regulated. 
 
Allowing unregulated connection by new generators to the transmission network is 
not efficient. While the negotiated transmission access charges have worked well for 
new generators, this has partly come at the expense of incumbent users. In order to 
facilitate access and reduce the ability of incumbent transmission companies from 
holding up new generators, new generators have a right to be connected in the absence of 
an agreement about charges. This means that new entrants can impose congestion costs 
on existing users of the transmission network and puts the transmission company in a 
weak negotiating position with the generators. Normally transmission companies with 
regulated monopolies can exercise market power over new generators by denying them 
access to the transmission network if they don’t pay regulated tariffs and the tariffs are 
                                                 
49 See Basanes, Saavedra and Soto (1999, pp.15-17). 
 18
regulated precisely because of the existence of market power. In Chile the situation is 
reversed in that generators can go ahead with connections and settle the prices via 
arbitration. This does not ensure that pricing signals will be efficient as the outcome 
depends on the sophistication of the arbitration process which is likely to be less than 
regulated access charges.
50
 
 
Negotiated access has given rise to a further problem: the fact that some transmission 
lines may not be remunerated. This is because transmission charges are negotiated around 
the concept of an influence area. This is the area where the power is deemed to flow from 
generators to their customers. It is possible to show that certain sections of the linear 
backbone will not be remunerated on the basis of power flows even though they have 
backup capability to the system as a whole. The overall effect is therefore that 
transmission revenues are uncertain and that the cost of capital in transmission is 
unnecessarily high. A system of regulated transmission charges combined with a system 
of recovering congestion costs aimed at remunerating the cost of the whole network 
should solve both problems and reduce the riskiness of transmission investment in Chile. 
This is one of the aims of the Ley Corta and the law should be effective in addressing this 
point. 
 
Both generators and customers should have to pay for transmission. Currently, 
transmission costs are being paid 100% by the generators who package energy costs and 
transmission delivery. This is inefficient because it does not give customers the choice to 
trade off energy and transmission costs in a way that would minimise their total costs. For 
example, it might be the case that a regulated distribution company could reduce the cost 
of its purchased power costs by paying for some extra transmission capacity which it 
would not be in the interests of the generators to pay for (because it increased effective 
competition in the market). The current node pricing system does not allow customers to 
pass through their own costs of transmission so the transmission network may not be 
optimally configured from the point of view of both generation and supply. Likewise 
distributors have no incentive to economise on the use of the transmission network if they 
can pass through to regulated customers all of the transmission costs from generators. 
What is required is sharing of transmission charges between distributors and generators 
combined with an incentive mechanism on the regulated distributors to minimise the sum 
of generation plus transmission costs (this happens in most other countries where supply 
companies must pay some proportion of transmission charges).  
 
The regulation of Transelec interferes with efficient operation.  The total costs of 
transmission in the Chilean system are small (around 3% of the total electricity bill) and 
this seems to have reduced the pressure to regulate the transmission monopoly in the SIC 
system, Transelec, in a way that clearly gives optimal incentives to efficient operation. 
Although Transelec’s charges were unregulated until the passage of the Ley Corta, they 
will now become regulated. The new regulation will include a 10% regulated real rate of 
return on assets combined with competitive bidding for operation and maintenance, 
capital upgrades and system extensions. Such competitive bidding is already mandatory 
                                                 
50 Even though the overall tariff revenue does need to be regulated, local tariff variations to reflect 
congestion effects can be implemented. 
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for Transelec. As such Transelec does not exploit economies of scale, scope or learning 
in transmission operation and building. While this scheme is highly innovative, it is 
clearly a model followed by any other advanced transmission system where such 
economies are assumed (in particular by Transelec’s parent company, the vertically 
integrated, Hydro-Quebec).
51
 
 
Such subcontracting is a function of the regulatory system which requires subcontracting 
for regulation but it is not necessarily the most efficient market outcome. The transaction 
costs of such a system are significant, in the short run these may be offset by bidding 
companies willing to take losses to gain a place in the market. However in the long run 
the number of active bidders is likely to fall and bidding costs will be fully reflected in 
their prices. The experience of enforced bidding for private sector finance contracts for 
public works in the UK seems to have followed this pattern.52 Consistency of regulation 
would suggest that Transelec should be regulated in a way that is consistent with the way 
that the distribution companies are regulated: i.e. price controls set for a four year period 
based on a model company’s costs. 
 
4.3 The Distribution and Retail Sector 
 
There is a need for a regulated third party access charge in order to correctly 
regulate the access to the monopoly distribution network by third party suppliers. 
The issue of financial bypass of a monopoly facility is one which has been addressed by 
the efficient component pricing rule. However in Chile there is no regulation of access 
charges to the distribution network, merely the final distribution value added which, 
combines the distribution and retailing charges. Generators who might wish to contract 
directly with large customers embedded in the distribution network find it difficult to 
negotiate fair access terms. In theory this should not happen inefficiently as if generators 
are genuinely cheaper at providing power and retailing they should be able to reach a 
bargaining solution which makes both parties better off. This would be true if there were 
no advantages of incumbent supply – such as in marketing or in positioning for further 
market opening. 
 
Physical bypass of the incumbent distribution network is allowed and is sometimes 
feasible where large customers can be connected directly to the transmission network. 
This threat however may lead to wasteful duplication of assets and further reduces the 
incentive to efficient financial bypass. Incumbent distribution companies faced with the 
loss of any contribution to the fixed costs of their network from a large user may offer 
very low prices to large users which avoid the physical bypass but co-incidentally pre-
empt the financial bypass. This inhibits entry into the generation market by denying new 
generators a contract market. What is needed is a regulated third party access charge to 
                                                 
51 There may be an important distinction between contracting out of new building of large transmission 
projects and contracting out of operation and maintenance of the existing system. Large upgrades can be 
successfully tendered for in the international market and have a use value in that the construction cost 
arrived at in the tender can be used directly in calculating the required addition to the regulatory asset base. 
Such tendering does seem to have been successful in Argentina (see Littlechild and Skerk, 2004). 
52 See Pollitt (2002). 
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the distribution network which encourages efficient financial bypass and increases the 
amount of competition for embedded ‘free’ customers. This will be especially important 
when the threshold definition of a ‘free’ customer is lowered to 0.5 MW increasing the 
number of embedded customers in the competitive supply market. The Ley Corta has 
moved to address this point and recognised that third party access charges to the 
distribution network need to be regulated. 
 
Assessment of efficient Distribution VAD is hampered by the legal specification of 
the methodology of assessment. The process of assessing distribution VAD is currently 
restricted by the enforced use of an engineering model of the distribution system with no 
account being taken of the actual cost of the network on the comparative cost of other 
distribution networks or of data trends. In practice data from the year of assessment is 
used to calibrate the model company. This appears to have led to gaming by the 
companies who report higher costs in the year of assessment and whose consultant 
reports consistently document higher costs than the regulator’s consultant reports.
53
 The 
calibration of the model company involves the assumption of a 10% real return on the 
new replacement value of the assets employed and involves the construction of an ideal 
company on the basis of actual demands and sources of supply. The overall price review 
can be reopened if the average return for the industry (electricity income only) is outside 
the range of 5 to 15% (it was 13.9% in 2002). However, the other income that the 
companies earn from leasing their lines to cable or telecom companies, does not count 
towards their regulated income thus leading to electricity customers paying for the full 
cost of the lines (this does not happen in the UK). 
 
In theory the model company approach has appealing incentive properties in terms of 
making the revenue of the distribution company outside its control and giving it perfect 
incentives to reduce costs. However, the theoretical weakness of this system is that it 
relies heavily on the detailed structure of the benchmark model which may or may not 
bear any relationship to the reality of operating a distribution network in a particular 
environment. In practice additional distortion is introduced by the use of actual costs in 
the construction of the model company. The currently high rate of return on the 
distribution sector as a whole – much higher than in generation – suggests that the use of 
a model company is in this case excessively generous to the companies. If prices were 
reduced in order to bring the companies actual regulated rate of return down from its 
current 13.9% to 10% this might result in the value added in distribution falling by over 
10%.
54
  
 
In practice the calculation and checking of the costs of the model company is a time 
consuming task and involves truckloads of information being given to the regulator.55 
Higher level techniques (such as data envelopment analysis, corrected ordinary least 
                                                 
53 Di Tella and Dyck (2002) find that stock prices of listed Chilean distribution companies rise on the 
announcement of higher costs during a year of assessment while falling on the same news in non-
assessment years. 
54 Assuming that capital costs are equal to half the revenue of a distribution company and its capital costs 
must provide a return on assets and cover depreciation of 3% per year. 
55 See Di Tella and Dyck (2002) for a qualitative description of the process. 
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squares and stochastic frontier analysis) which involve analysing a few categories of 
overall cost in relation to a small number of outputs exist which substantially curtail the 
transaction cost and reduce the scope for gaming. These techniques have been 
successfully employed in regulation in Norway, Australia and the UK.
56
 These models 
are more transparent and fair to the companies as they set regulated revenue with 
reference to the achieved costs in a comparator group of companies, they can also make 
good use of international data for the purposes of comparison.
57
 There is also a question 
mark about whether the VAD model is capable of being implemented by consultants for 
the price that the CNE is allowed to pay. This was around $600,000 in 2000 which is less 
than one fifth of the figure for the UK distribution price control58 which involved fewer 
companies (14 as opposed to 34) and a less complex methodology. 
 
The node pricing system is unnecessary and inhibits long term contracts.  Within the 
SIC system 70% of demand pays the regulated node price of energy. The idea of a node 
price is to reduce the exposure of residential customers to price spikes which might exist 
in a hydro system in years of extremely unfavourable hydrological conditions. This 
seems to be misconceived. In a completely free market customers who value price 
stability can buy stable prices direct from their suppliers who will then absorb or re-
insure against the risks of high spot prices. In other words long term contracts (which 
allow recovery of a surplus in periods of low spot prices to compensate for losses in 
periods of high spot prices) can be entered into if valued by customers. The problem 
when there are regulated customers who have only one supplier is how to encourage the 
optimal amount of price smoothing.  
 
The Chilean system imposes smoothing by only allowing distributors to pass through the 
smoothed price. However the smoothing mechanism itself is problematic. It represents a 
four year forward looking average of electricity prices and is reset every six months. As 
such it is poor at responding to short run price signals as happened during the 1998-99 
drought, when the node price in November 1998 was predicting lower prices than six 
months earlier. Until the passage of the Ley Corta the node price was also restricted to be 
within + or – 10% of the free price. The problem with this was that at –10% generation 
companies may make significant losses thus it may be difficult for the generation and 
distribution companies to find a bargaining region where they can agree a meaningful 
long term contract with the optimal amount of insurance. The reduction of the banding of 
the node price around the free price to + or – 5% (following the Ley Corta) will reduce 
this problem but not eliminate it. The effect of the node price system has thus been to 
reduce the amount of long term contracting between generators and distributors to supply 
regulated customers. Some distributors have even preferred to purchase on the spot 
market to supply regulated customers. This would seem to be a perverse effect for a 
system aimed at promoting price stability and reducing exposure to spot market prices. 
 
                                                 
56 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) for a survey. 
57 See Estache, Rossi and Ruzzier (2002) for an international comparison of electricity distribution 
company efficiency including Chile and Argentina. 
58 National Audit Office (2002) reports that the OFGEM’s 2000 distribution price control review cost 
£2.5m. 
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An open auction for long-term contracts to supply regulated customers combined with 
some benchmarking of the long-term contract prices paid by the distributors on behalf of 
their regulated customers would ensure a large degree of smoothing. It would also ensure 
that high prices at times of shortage would be reflected (at least in expectation and in the 
price of un-contracted demands) in the regulated price. If there was still a need for 
smoothing the final price there could be a smoothing mechanism introduced on the final 
price to spread the payment for the high cost electricity by regulated customers. This 
could easily be achieved by a limit on the maximum dollar price rise in any six month 
period followed by a period of over recovery in prices to make up any revenue shortfall 
to cover the extra purchased power costs. 
 
The current node price setting mechanism, is too forward looking and does not reflect all 
short term information about water availability (a major failing during the 1998-99 
drought). It is also vulnerable to time specific misinformation about the availability of 
future demands (e.g. when Colbun’s CCGT was going to begin operation).
59
 If the node 
price is to be retained it needs to be made more responsive to all available information. 
For example, the current GOL model assumes all hydrologies are equally likely even 
during a prolonged drought. The consultant appointed to measure snow levels needs to be 
independent of the generator dominated CDEC-SIC. There needs to be penalties for 
companies whose predictions of availability are not subsequently met – otherwise there is 
room for strategically manipulating the node price. This appears to have happened in 
1998-99 when Colbun’s prediction of early introduction of their CCGT allowed the price 
of water to fall helping them to fulfil their supply contracts more cheaply. The proposal in 
the Short Law to reduce the range of variation of the node price from the free price to + 
or – 5% will reduce the likelihood of no bargaining region between the generators and 
distributors but it does not constitute a radical enough reform of the node pricing system. 
 
The compensation and penalties regime has been difficult to enforce and should be 
strengthened. Regulated customer compensation payments are legally specified to be the 
difference between the outage cost and the node price. For a 10% restriction in supply 
this would be around twice the normal price of electricity. These compensations are paid 
by the generators for whom the outage cost effectively becomes the marginal price of 
energy. Supply failure penalties are determined according to the seriousness of the failure 
on the part of the generator, transmission company or distribution company. Penalty 
payments were until 1999 subject to a maximum of $26000, in 1999 the maximum was 
raised to $6m as it was widely recognised that they were too low. During the drought of 
1998-99 no customer compensations or penalties were paid in spite of the value of 
compensations being legally specified. The reason why this occurred was because the 
generators (who would have been liable) claimed that the hydrological conditions were 
worse than the worst year in the 40 years which were used to calibrate the model of the 
node price (under Article 99 bis). The reason this occurred was because generation 
companies were able to claim force majeure due to the exceptionally dry conditions. This 
failure of the compensation system to operate is not optimal because it resulted in the 
absence of proper incentives to manage the electricity shortages and does not encourage 
                                                 
59 See Fischer and Galetovic (2000) on the shortcomings of the node pricing system during the 1998-99 
drought. 
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efficient rationing by distribution companies. The predictable result was that there were 
more blackouts than might otherwise have been the case and that the blackouts were 
random rather than managed.
60
 The 1999 revisions to the law corrected this loophole and 
gave the authority to authorise compensations and damages payments to the SEC. The 
SEC imposed a penalty of $7.2m in 2003 on a number of generators and transmitters, 
however it is not clear what the economic basis of penalty payments system is. 
 
There have been a wave of mergers in the distribution sector and the welfare 
consequences of this have not been evaluated. Most systems of regulation of 
distribution charges rely on comparison of costs among distribution companies. Such 
comparisons are more meaningful and can be made more accurate if there are a 
significant number of distribution companies under the regulators supervision. Chile 
currently has 34 distribution companies which is enough for statistically interesting 
comparisons of costs to be made. However the sector has seen a significant number of 
distribution mergers which reduce the number of potential comparators in regulation. 
While this is not necessarily a problem within the current system of regulation of 
distribution charges it may be if the system is reformed. Mergers of distribution 
companies are also effectively mergers of supply companies as well, hence they reduce 
the number of potential competitors for free customers when the market is liberalised. As 
a precaution it would seem sensible to insist on continuity of regulatory accounting for 
the existing component distribution companies to maintain the option value of cost based 
regulation. Some more in depth analysis of the long-term implications of these mergers 
would be desirable. 
 
4.4 The Practice of Regulation 
 
The restrictions on the mix of professional skills in the CNE and the SEC limit the 
effectiveness of their regulation. A notable feature of the Chilean regulatory system is 
the reliance on engineering models and the lack of input from economic analysis. This 
has the effect of a bias towards a ideal model driven solution (e.g. in the setting of the 
node price and the regulation of electricity distribution). This is instead of a solution 
which reflects the principles of economic regulation where incentives should reflect the 
fact that private agents have superior information and should be allowed to form efficient 
expectations about the future. It has also lead to a system which pays insufficient 
attention to the need to incentivise innovation and allow beneficial technical progress and 
learning (e.g. in the specification of the threshold limits on market opening or the 
required rate of return in the model company). This bias in approach partly reflects the 
legal restrictions on both the size and the professional backgrounds of staff within the 
CNE. These restrictions may have made sense in the context of a rigid regulatory regime 
created to prevent necessary regulatory creep but does not make sense in a modern 
regulator where engineering, law, economics, accounting and finance specialisms are 
required for economically optimal regulation. Only a subset of these skills are now 
present in the agency and this clearly undermines its effectiveness. Similarly there is a 
lack of economic analysis associated with the penalty regime set by the SEC. Penalties 
are important economic incentives and hence should be set with reference to the 
                                                 
60 See Fischer and Galetovic (2000). 
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economic damage inflicted (as with the US triple damages rule in competition cases 
which reflects both the probability of being caught and the actual damages). 
 
Regulatory oversight of crisis management at times of water shortage is essential in 
a hydro based system. It is predictable in the Chilean system that one year in 20 there 
will be a severe shortage of water for electricity generation leading to the need for much 
higher prices / blackouts. How the system responds in such a situation is vital for the 
stability of investment incentives and for political and popular support for the privatised 
industry. The response to the 1998-99 crisis was technically and politically very poor: 
political interference in the use of water worsened the crisis and the industry 
unnecessarily engaged in random (rather than planned) blackouts. The crisis management 
has improved: a plan now exists and fines have been raised to enforce better 
management. However there is clearly a need for a willingness to raise prices and or 
allow a more flexible response (e.g. customer bidding to be interrupted). Following the 
1999 law changes all customer demands must be proportionally reduced in a shortage 
situation. This does not exploit the differences in price elasticity of demand between 
customers and the willingness to accept interruption. It was put to us that a 20% rise in 
the residential price during a shortage would be enough to avoid the most severe 
blackouts. This may well be politically acceptable given the internationally low level of 
residential electricity prices in Chile and the fact that it would lead to lower prices in the 
19 non-shortage years (due to the saving of peak capacity). 
 
The transparency of the regulation and oversight of the industry needs to be 
improved. Transparency and openness in regulation of monopolies is important 
primarily because it reduces the likelihood of regulatory capture and the regulatory risk to 
companies who benefit from the stability that openness encourages. This comes about 
because regulatory decisions must be justified and consistent to informed external 
observers and because transparency allows replication of regulatory analysis and 
informed innovation of regulatory techniques by external parties. For a successful system 
that has a long history of regulation it is striking that there is a lack of published 
information about the practice of regulation on the websites of the CNE and SEC.  The 
CNE does not publish the reports on which its assessment of VAD is based and the SEC 
does not even produce an annual report.
61
 By comparison with the openness of the US, 
UK, Australian, Norwegian and Dutch regulators which have similarly advanced systems 
of regulation Chilean openness is poor and surprising. This is partly a function of the 
criminalisation of the publication by others of commercially sensitive information. This 
has made regulators reluctant to publish information which companies are unwilling to 
agree to publish. Recent moves towards more openness and e-government are to be 
welcomed and should be advanced as they would provide support to a more flexible 
system of regulation. 
 
There is a lack of representation of small customers within the regulatory process 
and in the governance of the market.  One of the main justifications for continuing 
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ministerial intervention in the electricity sector is because the democratic process should 
represent the interests of small regulated customers. This has some validity but it is 
clearly not the most efficient way to represent such customers within the system and may 
in fact be counter productive because it tends to lead to badly informed intervention 
based on short term political gain (as during a drought where a minister might think that 
customers prefer to put off rationing or price rises in the hope it might rain). A better 
alternative would seem to be the introduction of a formal role for small consumers in the 
governance of the industry as happens in many countries. In the UK Energywatch is the 
formal consumer association funded by an industry levy charged with handling 
complaints and representing consumers on industry governance boards. Such a body is 
capable of better representing customer preferences than the Minister of Energy because 
it is in direct touch with customers (through complaints and surveys) and is also well 
informed about the workings of the industry. Such a small consumer representative body 
can more carefully represent customer preferences about quality of supply and about 
willingness to accept lower prices in wet years and higher prices in dry years. Such 
representation also helps to formally police regulatory agencies and insure them against 
regulatory capture. 
 
Rural electrification in Chile has been a notable success however it is not clear that 
there is proper incentive regulation of the costs of rural connection. Chile has an 
impressive record on extending rural electrification in the 1990s, this is due to the focus 
that it has put on such electrification and the subsidy (up to 70%) to the costs of 
connection that exist. The connection subsidies are generous and this in large part 
explains the success of the rural electrification programme (now up to $2000 per 
customer connection). The question arises as to whether the scheme adequately 
incentivises least cost connection including isolated generation. Most extensions are 
carried out by local distribution companies on the basis of audited costs rather than on the 
basis of an open bidding competition for blocks of system extensions (one could imagine 
regional contracts). Given the emphasis of open competition in transmission extensions 
and the potential for competitive bidding to substantially lower costs it seems anomalous 
that competitive bidding is not used. 
 
4.5 The General Institutional Framework 
 
Continuing public ownership in the electricity sector after initial privatisation led to 
problems. Chile now has a fully privatised electricity system. However a lesson for other 
developing countries is that continuing public ownership can lead to the sort a prolonging 
of the bad decision making that public ownership can give rise to. In the case of Chile 
this legacy of public ownership led to serious problem. The privatisation of Colbun (the 
third largest generator) was not completed until 1997. During this time the decision was 
taken to procure a new CCGT design for its latest thermal power plant (Nehuenco) which 
was untested anywhere in the world. Such decisions are common in the public sector 
where engineering excellence is frequently valued more highly than commercial value. 
This decision proved a mistake because the failure to make the design work in time lead 
directly to a shortage of capacity during the 1998-99 drought and the prediction that the 
plant would work led to the node price being reduced when with hindsight it should have 
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gone up. This illustrates the propensity of publicly owned companies to take market risks 
which would not have been undertaken in the private sector, the company now only 
invests in tried and tested plant designs. 
 
The division of roles between the CNE and SEC creates the impression that there 
are two regulatory bodies – their roles should be reallocated so that there is one 
energy regulator. There is a confusing and unclear demarcation of regulatory 
responsibilities.62 This is likely to lead to inefficiency in the co-ordination of data 
collection and enforcement and transparency between CNE and SEC. Data collection 
(now the role of the SEC) plainly needs to be overseen by regulator (now the CNE) 
otherwise there is an inefficient process of intermediation. This separation of 
responsibilities was originally motivated by concerns that the SEC would be open to 
regulatory capture as it had the responsibility for the promotion of the sector and 
additional investment and that this might cause it to not take its role in increasing 
efficiency seriously. Clearly regulatory agencies which are output oriented must take both 
efficiency and the need for investment into account and there are substantial co-
ordination benefits from making these decisions jointly. Appropriate governance of the 
regulator rather than the creation of another regulatory agency would seem to be a more 
effective way of preventing regulatory capture, as it is generally thought that larger 
higher profile regulators (which would result from combining functions) are less 
susceptible to capture than smaller ones. It is interesting to note that the SEC-CNE 
separation is not a feature of the Telecoms sector in Chile where policy setting and 
efficiency goals are combined in one office. If there is to be a continuing role for the SEC 
it is surely as the consumer representative body handling customer complaints and 
representing the customer on industry governance boards such as the CDEC. 
 
The CNE should be freed from operational ministerial control and be constituted as 
an independent energy regulator rather than as advisor to the Minister of Economy. 
The current advisory role of the CNE lays it open to challenge and does not clearly align 
the agency incentives to behave in the public interest, in particular it gives it a tendency 
to lobby within government to have its advice (albeit watered down) accepted. The CNE 
should be subject to only limited political oversight by the Ministry for Economy. The 
current situation requires the Minister to hear appeals, declare rationing decrees and 
involves conflict caused by different coalition parties receiving different Presidential 
appointments (both the Minister and the head of the CNE are presidential appointments). 
In 1997 the Minister reduced the reserve capacity level assumed in the peak capacity 
payment calculation from 15% to 6.7%, this is not a variable that should be under 
ministerial control (as it may be in the interests of generators to reduce this at times of 
shortage of capacity to keep their power purchase costs down).63 
 
The involvement of the Ministry in dispute resolution is extremely inefficient in that it 
has lengthened the time during which decisions are in doubt and invited lobbying.  
During the 1998-99 crisis the generators in the CDEC-SIC could not agree what price 
should rule in the spot market – the outage cost or the cost of the most expensive thermal 
                                                 
62 This has been recognised in Chile (see Jadresic, Blantot and San Martin, 2001). 
63 See Watts and Ariztia (2002). 
 27
plant.
64
 This was referred to the Minister for a decision, which he referred to the CNE for 
advice. The CNE advised in five days that the outage cost should stand. However the 
Minister then took almost 4 months to confirm this recommendation. This worsened the 
crisis as generators were left with a weaker price signal than should have been the case to 
invest in emergency generation. There is a need for a genuinely independent regulator 
agency with the head of the agency appointed for a fixed term by the relevant Minister 
and only capable of being removed in exceptional circumstances. The only reasonable 
explanation for the delay was the lobbying of the Minister by generators, short of 
capacity to fulfil contracts, who would have to pay a higher price to make up their 
contractual shortfalls if the spot price was the outage cost rather than the cost of marginal 
plant. The final decision was weakened by referring the determination of when the crisis 
started to the CNE which then led to a further dispute. The net result was that were was 
no clear spot price for the whole of the crisis period. 
 
The Ministry also has too great a role in declaring the need for rationing. This should be 
an economic decision as politicisation makes it highly likely that there will be a sub-
optimal delay in rationing and increases scope for lobbying by companies. It is also 
unclear why a council of ministers is required to oversee the sector if the role of the 
agency is clearly and widely defined. The Council recently played a role in mediating a 
dispute between the former head of the CNE and the Minister of the Economy but if the 
roles of the Minister and CNE are clearer and the appoint process less confrontational 
then this role for the Council would not be necessary in the future. 
 
Regulatory discretion should be increased according to the general principle that 
specific numbers, market designs and ‘free’ customer size threshold levels relating 
to a private electricity sector should not be specified in legislation. The concern to 
prevent too much discretion in regulation has been excessive with no major changes to 
the regulatory regime since 1982 and a failed attempt at comprehensive reform in 2000. 
While we appreciate that these inflexibilities successfully guaranteed the success of the 
investment in privatisation the rigidity prevents appropriate updating of the regulatory 
regime as new information comes in regarding the current working of the system. With 
hindsight such restrictions on regulatory discretion in electricity went too far given the 
general  legal protection and political respect for property rights in Chile. 
 
The Chilean law relating to the electricity sector has been rendered inflexible by the 
detailed specifications of the regulation governing the sector. This gives rise to two major 
problems: first it is very different to change market design and rules in the light of market 
evolution without changing the legislation; second detailed specification, based on expert 
opinion, is very difficult for the legislature to appreciate and gives rise to the likelihood 
of gaps and inconsistencies appearing the legislation which cannot be easily remedied 
(e.g. there is no clear definition of an influence area in transmission in the legislation, 
hence some of the problems of under-recovery on certain transmission lines). The 
Chilean law relating to electricity currently specifies the threshold limit on competition 
(0.5MW), the number of people in the regulatory agency (45 in the CNE), regulated rates 
of return (10%), the weightings to be given to consulting reports of the company and 
                                                 
64 See Fischer and Galetovic (2000). 
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regulator (1/3 vs 2/3), the share of transmission costs to be paid by the generators (100%) 
as well as technical details of the legislation such as the way that ancillary services 
should be remunerated. All of the aforementioned could be decided by the regulator in 
conjunction with the relevant industry governance bodies such as the CDEC as the 
market evolves. The specification of such rules limits the scope for handling unforeseen 
technical progress (in 1982, no-one foresaw that below 2MW customers could exist in a 
competitive market). However, it is the case that such details have a value in situations 
where investors have genuine concerns about the financial impact of loss of market share 
following market opening. 
 
The rules governing the sector are based on the requirements of the central SIC 
system not the northern SING system. The law treats the CDEC-SIC and the CDEC-
SING system as equivalent with identical rules. This is problematic. The proposed short 
law sets out to correct some of the problems of the existing law as it relates to the SIC 
with the side effect that there may be negative consequences for the SING. The SING 
does not have the non-payment problem in transmission that relates to the SIC. However 
the effect of the proposed law will be to substantially socialise the payments in a way that 
many of the players will be left worse off with no obvious benefits to the incentives to 
optimise the use and expansion of the lines. The SING system is also a candidate for the 
introduction of a price based bidding system while the SIC system is not. Legislation 
should be amended to reflect the differing circumstances of the two systems or devolve 
more of the detailed rule making to appropriately constituted CDEC governance boards. 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
 
The Chilean experience of electricity reform is the longest amongst both developed and 
developing countries and deserves to be studied for this reason. However it should 
stressed that the particular institutional designs adopted in Chile reflect very clearly the 
legacy of the economic policies of the military dictatorship. That painful experience, in 
this instance, has had a lasting positive economic legacy: an institutional bias towards a 
status quo which protects the property rights of initial owners of capital in the electricity 
sector.
65
  
 
Many of the problems of the Chilean electricity sector are hence problems of loosening 
the restrictions which the initial legislation placed around changing the regulatory regime 
in ways that might disturb those initial rights. While such restrictions were a deliberate 
attempt to tie the hands of future governments it is not clear that they were necessary 
given the strength of the general institution of property rights in Chile. For most 
developing countries the opposite bias prevails: a tendency to renege on regulatory 
contracts with initial private property holders leading to high costs of capital and failed 
reforms. 
 
                                                 
65 See Murillo (2001) for  a discussion of the impact of politics on privatization in Argentina, Chile and 
Mexico and see Heller and McCubbins (1996) for a discussion of the impact of politics on regulation in 
Argentina and Chile. 
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Chile’s electricity reforms very clearly reveal how the protection of property rights within 
a regulatory system which limits the ability of incumbents to exploit market power can 
capture most of the gains from reform.. We have made many suggestions for reform of 
the sector in Chile on the basis of its long experience, some of which have now been 
included in the 2004 revision of the law. However it is clear that these are second order 
changes aimed at helping a manifestly successful system continue to be successful in the 
face of new learning. 
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Table 1: System Operating Characteristics 
 
    Installed  Maximum 
Gross 
Generation 
Sales 
    Capacity Demand    
SYSTEM Year MW MW GWh GWh 
SING 1998 1,475.5 1,020.9 7,357.5 6,616.4 
  1999 2,501.5 1,093.6 9,001.0 8,119.6 
  2000 3,317.0 1,153.5 9,327.4 8,398.0 
  2001 3,440.9 1,221.0 9,851.0 8,991.1 
  2002 3,633.9 1,420.0 10,399.6 9,481.9 
  2003 3,633.9 1,466.6 11,424.2 10,480.3 
SIC 1998 6,274.5 3,991.4 25,658.2 24,245.5 
  1999 6,681.9 4,185.5 26,920.2 25,530.3 
  2000 6,646.3 4,516.0 29,576.8 27,916.3 
  2001 6,572.7 4,694.0 30,765.0 29,143.3 
  2002 6,732.9 4,878.0 31,971.3 30,330.4 
  2003 6,991.9 5,162.2 33,708.1 32,091.7 
AYSEN 1998 17.11 12.9 66.0 62.8 
  1999 17.11 13.4 71.1 67.4 
  2000 17.11 13.8 74.7 71.4 
  2001 20.70 13.9 77.6 74.7 
  2002 23.41 15.2 85.9 83.0 
  2003 33.91 n/d n/d n/d 
MAGALLANES 1998 64.38 32.0 151.7 146.5 
  1999 64.38 31.8 154.8 149.5 
  2000 64.42 33.7 163.1 159.1 
  2001 64.50 34.0 170.4 165.0 
  2002 64.46 35.1 176.5 170.1 
  2003 78.40 n/d n/d n/d 
 
Source: www.cne.cl 
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Table 2A: Total Installed Capacity by type and company 
SING System (December 2003): 
 
Operating Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Company Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
AES GENER 642.8 17.69% 
CELTA 181.75 5.00% 
EDELNOR 719.78 19.81% 
ELECTROANDINA 1028.9 28.31% 
GASATACAMA 783.30 21.56% 
NORGENER 277.34 7.63% 
Total Gross Installed Capacity 3633.87 100.00% 
   
   
Type of Plant Gross Installed Gross Installed 
 Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Coal 1205.74 33.18% 
Diesel 130.44 3.59% 
Fuel Oil No. 6 172.65 4.75% 
Gas Natural 2111.65 58.11% 
Hydro 13.39 0.37% 
Total Gross Installed Capacity 3633.87 100.00% 
   
   
Type of Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Plant Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Thermal 3620.48 99.63% 
Hydro 13.39 0.37% 
Total Gross Installed Capacity 3633.87 100.00% 
 
Source: www.cne.cl 
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Table 2B:Total Installed Capacity by type and company 
SIC System (April 2004): 
   
Operating Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Company Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
ARAUCO GENERACION S.A. 132.0 1.84% 
GENER S.A. 781.4 10.87% 
COLBUN S.A. 1,550.0 21.57% 
ENDESA 2,100.3 29.22% 
GUACOLDA S.A. 304.0 4.23% 
PANGUE S.A. 467.0 6.50% 
PEHUENCHE S.A. 623.0 8.67% 
S.E. SANTIAGO S.A. 379.0 5.27% 
SAN ISIDRO S.A. 370.0 5.15% 
IBENER S.A. 124.0 1.73% 
ACONCAGUA S.A. 97.9 1.36% 
PETROPOWER S.A. 48.6 0.68% 
PILMAIQUEN S.A. 39.0 0.54% 
PULLINQUE S.A. 48.6 0.68% 
H.G. VIEJA Y M. VALPO. 39.3 0.55% 
OTRAS 82.8 1.15% 
Total Installed Capacity 7,186.9 100.00% 
   
   
Type of Plant Gross Installed Gross Installed 
 Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Black liquor steam 53.0 0.74% 
Steam Coal 937.7 13.05% 
gas-diesel 91.3 1.27% 
gas-IFO 180 64.2 0.89% 
Single cycle natural gas 727.9 10.13% 
Wood 96.4 1.34% 
Combined cycle natural gas 1,119.0 15.57% 
Petroleum Derivatives 48.6 0.68% 
Run of River Hydro 1,295.4 18.02% 
Reservoir Hydro 2,753.4 38.31% 
Total Installed Capacity 7,186.9 100.00% 
   
   
Type of Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Plant Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Thermal 3,138.1 43.66% 
Hydro 4,048.8 56.34% 
Total Installed Capacity 7,186.9 100.00% 
 
Source: www.cne.cl 
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Table 2C: Total Installed Capacity by type and company 
Aysen System (December 2003): 
 
Operating Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Company Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
EDELAYSEN S.A. 33.91 100.0% 
Total Installed Capacity 33.91 100.0% 
   
   
Type of Plant Gross Installed Gross Installed 
 Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Hydro 17.0 50.1% 
Diesel 11.0 32.3% 
IFO 4.0 11.8% 
Wind 2.0 5.8% 
Total Installed Capacity 33.9 100.0% 
   
   
Type of Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Plant Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Thermal 15.0 44.1% 
Renewables 2.0 5.8% 
Hydro 17.0 50.1% 
Total Installed Capacity 33.9 100.0% 
 
Source: www.cne.cl 
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Table 2D:Total Installed Capacity by type and company 
Magellanes System: 
 
Operating Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Company Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
EDELMAG S.A. 78.4 100.0% 
Total Installed Capacity 78.4 100.0% 
   
   
Type of Plant Gross Installed Gross Installed 
 Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Natural Gas 67.7 86.4% 
Diesel 10.7 13.6% 
Total Installed Capacity 78.4 100.0% 
   
   
Type of Gross Installed Gross Installed 
Plant Capacity [MW] Capacity [%] 
Thermal 78.4 100.0% 
Hydro 0.0 0.0% 
Total Installed Capacity 78.4 100.0% 
 
Source: www.cne.cl 
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Table 3: Distribution System Characteristics at 31st December 2001 
 
Company 
Region of 
Distribution 
Regulated 
Customers 
Purchases Sales 
          
 Name  at 31.12.01 KWH KWH 
01 EMELARI I 53,812 190,802,694 183,300,239 
02 ELIQSA I 60,446 311,429,843 290,504,072 
03 ELECDA II 117,725 537,441,480 493,794,948 
04 EMELAT III 70,785 421,558,731 369,199,738 
05 EMEC IV y V 199,917 687,945,793 666,792,419 
06 CHILQUINTA V 405,573 1,720,973,928 1,599,174,955 
07 CONAFE V y VII 138,818 683,176,000 641,390,791 
08 EMELCA V 4,205 10,391,361 9,158,952 
09 LITORAL V 35,213 57,256,249 50,057,377 
10 CHILECTRA RM 1,274,410 9,832,331,843 9,255,646,782 
11 RÍO MAIPO RM 294,156 1,329,868,807 1,238,489,849 
12 COLINA RM 14,151 37,628,340 34,592,995 
13 TIL-TIL RM 2,616 7,368,432 6,693,939 
14 EEPA RM 34,600 156,416,303 151,838,598 
15 LUZ ANDES RM 1,489 5,185,908 5,660,852 
16 SEP RM 3,386 24,649,467 22,691,367 
17 
EMELECTRI
C 
RM, VI y VII 178,976 715,056,432 619,727,670 
18 CGE RM, VI, VII, VIII y IX 629,930 3,182,524,417 2,923,723,267 
19 EMELPAR I s/i s/i s/i 
21 COOPELAN VIII 8,426 39,649,505 33,002,112 
22 FRONTEL VIII y IX 219,328 512,989,094 443,310,347 
23 SAESA IX y X 238,715 1,225,442,141 1,112,950,326 
24 EDELAYSEN XI 20,188 74,724,950 67,966,877 
25 EDELMAG XII 45,801 164,993,873 156,012,613 
26 CODINER VIII y IX 7,890 35,413,384 30,724,725 
27 ELECOOP IV 8,790 33,693,932 28,075,859 
28 EDECSA V 2,489 25,735,552 23,129,440 
29 CEC VII 6,057 55,316,934 49,724,206 
30 EMETAL VII 14,692 52,742,358 44,447,255 
31 LUZLINARES VII 15,854 54,138,449 49,776,783 
32 LUZPARRAL VII 12,276 31,693,047 27,566,971 
33 COPELEC VIII 28,252 82,291,492 71,783,826 
34 COELCHA VIII 7,891 20,523,753 17,306,967 
35 SOCOEPA X 3,818 20,027,734 16,946,184 
36 COOPREL X 4,542 19,444,752 15,521,740 
39 CREO X 12,549 95,283,841 85,870,905 
TOTAL   4,177,766 22,456,110,819 20,836,555,946 
 
Source: www.cne.cl 
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Figure 1: Average Node Prices in the SIC (blue line) and SING (brown line) systems 
January 2004 Prices 
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Source: www.cne.cl 
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Figure 2: Financial Performance of leading companies (historic cost rate of return on 
equity) (not available for Chilectra in 1987) 
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Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.44). 
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Figure 3: Labour Productivity since Privatisation in leading companies 
 
Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.42-43) and Annual Reports. 
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Figure 4: Quality of Supply: Energy Losses (Technical and Non-Technical) 
Chilectra Energy Losses %
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Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.42) and Chilectra Annual Reports. 
 
